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JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION*
WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEYtA MOST of you no doubt are aware, the present year has marked the two-
hundredth anniversary of Chief Justice John Marshall's birth. Mar-
shall was born on the 24th of September 1755, in what is now Fau-
quier County, Virginia. He died in Philadelphia, while still holding the office
of Chief Justice of the United States, a few weeks less than eighty years later.
One hundred and twenty years have thus elapsed since John Marshall com-
pleted the judicial labors for which he is so greatly celebrated. In that long
interval, ten other Americans have held the office that Marshall held, and
three preceded him in it. Our Chief Justices have included some very distin-
guished and able men; but, by universal consent, Marshall is recognized to
stand pre-eminent-indeed, unrivalled-among them. The appellation, "the
great Chief Justice," is still today, as it long has been, a completely unam-
biguous reference to John Marshall, and to no one else.
Now, I mean not to dissent from this universal view of Marshall's great-
ness; yet I do think that the true nature of his judicial career, particularly in
the field of constitutional interpretation, has long been very generally mis-
understood. According to the usual view, Marshall is conceived to have dom-
inated his associates on the Supreme Court so completely that he was able to
make the constitutional decisions of that tribunal express his own ideas and
nothing else. His own ideas, it is further commonly assumed, were those of
his own political party, the Federalists. So, the common view is that John
Marshall was able to use, and did use, his domination of his court to read
the old Federalist constitutional views into his court's decisions and thus to
* This is a reprint of a speech delivered by Professor Crosskey as one of a series of
talks on Justices of the Supreme Court delivered by various experts at the University of
Chicago Law School. All of the speeches will be published this fall in book form under
the title "Mr. justice."
1 Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
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lay the foundations upon which our constitutional law ever since has rested;
or-as some might wish to insist-the foundations upon which it rested until
the notorious "Roosevelt court fight," of some eighteen years ago.
For the general prevalence of this view of John Marshall's work in con-
stitutional law, his biographer, Albert J. Beveridge, is undoubtedly, in con-
siderable measure, responsible.1 But such a view of Marshall's work ante-
dated Beveridge's biography. The late Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., for one,
took such a view of the subject fifteen years before the first of Beveridge's
volumes appeared. The occasion was the centennial, in 1901, of Marshall's
taking his seat as Chief Justice, upon the Supreme Court of the United
States, and Holmes, as chief justice of Massachusetts, was answering a mo-
tion that the supreme court of that state adjourn in commemoration of the
event. Holmes was not so gracious on this occasion as he usually was. He felt
honest doubt about Marshall's greatness and rather inappropriately expressed
it. He doubted, he said, "whether, after [Alexander] Hamilton and the Con-
stitution itself, Marshall's work proved more than a strong intellect, a good
style, personal ascendancy in his court, courage, justice and the convictions
of his party." Holmes conceded, however, that it had been a "fortunate"
thing that the appointment of a chief justice, in 1801, had fallen to John
Adams, instead of Thomas Jefferson, and so g[i]ve[n] it," as he explained,
"to a Federalist and loose constructionist to start the working of the Constitu-
tion.. ," Now, these remarks of Holmes plainly evince the same view of
Marshall's work that I have already mentioned as the view commonly taken:
Marshall dominated his court; he used his dominance to read Federalist
party doctrines into the Constitution; and thus the basis of our constitutional
law was laid. And along with these ideas, we have, in the case of Holmes, the
further notion, which is also a common one, that the old Federalist constitu-
tional views were based upon a "loose" construction of the Constitution.
Let me begin with this last idea. Is it true that the old Federalist constitu-
tional views depended upon a loose construction of the Constitution? It most
certainly is not. The Federalist views depended, first of all, upon a strict ad-
herence to certain rules of documentary interpretation that were then quite
generally accepted as proper. They depended, further, upon giving meaning
to every single provision that the Constitution contains, and, also, upon giving
significance to every difference in phraseology to be found in its various pro-
visions. The Federalist views depended, in other words, upon a literal reading
of the Constitution in all its parts; and in the few cases, if there were any
such, where more than one meaning was possible, the ambiguity was to be
I Consult for example, 4 Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 59-61 (1919).
2 Holmes, Collected Legal Papers, 266, 268, 269 (1920). For a recent expression of this
view of Marshall's work, consult Cahn, John Marshall--Our 'Greatest Dissenter,' The
New York Times Magazine, p. 14 (Aug. 21, 1955).
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resolved, according to the Federalist views, by a strict adherence to the then
accepted rule of choosing the meaning that best comported with the objects,
or purposes, of the Constitution, which the Preamble states. In any ordinary
use of words, the Federalist views depended, then, upon a rigorous, not a
loose construction of the document.3
The views of their opponents-the Jeffersonians-were the views that
really depended upon a loose construction. The Jeffersonian views called for
disregarding certain parts of the Constitution completely. These parts-the
parts that then were known as "the general phrases" of the document-were
to be made absolutely meaningless. Other parts were to be twisted from their
original meaning in a manner unfavorable to the national powers, and limita-
tions were to be read into the document that it undeniably does not contain.4
Now, if these are the true facts about the Federalist and Jeffersonian views
of the Constitution, how has the notion come to be accepted, in what is known
as history, that the old Federalist views depended upon a loose construction
of the document? In part, this is a result of the paucity and imperfection of
the records of the Federalist period. The Senate of the United States, during
its first five years, sat behind closed doors; no record at all of its debates for
this period exists. In addition to this, there was no official reporting of the
debates in either house of Congress during the early years. There was, it is
true, some private reporting, some of which was afterwards republished in,
and as, The Annals of Congress, in the 1830's; but these private reports
from the formative period of our government are both imperfect and incom-
plete.5
As for the courts of justice of the period-particularly the Supreme Court-
the cases in them did not bring up constitutional issues that went to the
essence of the old Federalist views of the subject; and this remained true, in
the main, during the first six or seven years of John Marshall's Chief Justice-
ship, when there was still a Federalist majority on the Court. The result of all
' The old Federalist views of the Constitution are developed fully in Crosskey, Politics
and the Constitution in the History of the United States, passim (1953). This publication
is hereinafter cited as P. & C.
'Ibid.
The Annals of Congress covering the early years of the Government were a reprint of
Thomas Lloyd's contemporaneously published Congressional Register, a private report of
debates in the House of Representatives. The most casual inspection of Lloyd's Register
discloses that it was not a complete report of these debates, but a report of picked and
chosen parts, and of picked and chosen speeches. The reporting is uneven. Some of it is
very well done and seemingly complete, as, for example, the debates, on June 8, 1789,
when James Madison proposed the initial amendments to the Constitution. Other de-
bates-for example, those on these same amendments, on August 19, 1789-are omitted
entirely. And still other parts of the reporting-for example, that on the same subject,
two days earlier-are, on the basis of other and better surviving evidence, demonstrably
inaccurate. In the instance mentioned, this other and better evidence consists of the offi-
cial journals of the House and the Senate. Cf., P. & C. 702-3. Consult, also, note 36 infra.
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these factors, taken together, was an imperfect and meager recording of the
Federalist views; they became forgotten; and because the Jeffersonians, with
their usual perversity, accused the Federalists of advocating a loose construc-
tion-the offense of which they themselves were guilty-and because, further-
more, the Jeffersonians won out politically, their charge has stuck in conse-
quence of simple ignorance today as to what the old Federalist views were.
The situation I have just described has manifestly been favorable, likewise,
to the rise of the misconception of John Marshall's work to which I have al-
ready alluded. But in the case of Marshall, there have been other factors at
work, too. For one thing, Marshall persuaded his court to follow the practice
of delivering court opinions, instead of individual opinions, in the cases de-
cided; and in most of the cases, Marshall wrote and delivered the Court's
opinions himself, especially in those involving constitutional issues. In conse-
quence, it is usually assumed today that everything in these opinions repre-
sents Marshall's own views and, hence, Federalist views. Yet, if we remember
that nearly all of Marshall's constitutional opinions were delivered for a
Court with a hand-picked Jeffersonian majority upon it, it is certainly un-
deniable that such a view of the Marshall opinions is one inherently improb-
able. 6
Such a view of the matter is, moreover, at variance with what Marshall
himself described as the practice of his Court. Its practice, he indicated, in
1819, was what, he said, "[t]he course of every tribunal must necessarily be."
"[T]he opinion which is to be delivered as the opinion of the court is," he
said, "previously submitted to the consideration of all the judges; and, if any
part of the reasoning be disapproved, it must be so modified as to receive the
approbation of all, before it can be delivered as the opinion of all."'7 I do not
myself see how the facts could possibly have been otherwise than as Marshall
stated them; or how it can be supposed, for a moment, that he did not, in
many instances, have to compromise, or give up, his own and the Federalist
views of the Constitution.
There are still other factors, moreover, that have contributed to the mis-
conception of Marshall's work. One was his settled practice of not dissenting
when he disagreed with the views of his Court. We have his own word for this.
In Bank of United States v. Dandridge, in 1827, he said it had long been his
"custom when [he] ha[d] the misfortune to differ from th[e] court, [to]
acquiesce silently in its opinion. . . ."s Justice Joseph Story, who usually
'Most of these opinions postdate 1812, when the Jeffersonian Court majority was first
achieved.
" The quoted material is from an anonymous newspaper essay that Marshall wrote and
had published in the Philadelphia Union, in the year mentioned in the text. Consult 4
Beveridge, op. cit. supra note 1 at 318-22.
' 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 64, 90 (1827). The Dandridge case itself and Ogden v. Saunders,
12 Wheat. (U.S.) 213 (1827), appear to be the only cases in which Marshall departed
from his practice of silent acquiescence.
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agreed with Marshall's constitutional views, followed the same practice.9 And
the associate of both, Justice William Johnson, said, in 1822, that "in some
Instances," Marshall actually wrote and delivered the Court's opinion even
"when [it was] contrary to his own Judgement and Vote." The Associate
Justices were lazy, Johnson said; Marshall was willing to perform the labor
of writing the opinions, and the Associates were content to let him do it.1°
Now, surely, in the light of this last mentioned practice, it is perilous in the
extreme to ascribe to John Marshall and, hence, to the old Federalists, who
produced the Constitution, everything that his opinions contain. And we are
likewise unwarranted in making such ascriptions merely on the basis of Mar-
shall's silent acquiescence in various of the views of his Court. Why Marshall
followed the practices I have just outlined, he never explained. But the fact
is that the period of his Chief Justiceship was a period of constitutional de-
cay. Time after time, Marshall was forced into compromise, or outright de-
feat, upon what it can easily be shown were his own views or, else, the old
Federalist views of the Constitution, which, it is natural to suppose, he shared.
It probably seemed to Marshall thoroughly unwise to underline such facts as
these before the country and thus, perhaps, to encourage further attacks
upon the Constitution, to the defense of which his life after 1801 was so
largely devoted.
I have said that the period of John Marshall's Chief Justiceship was a
period of constitutional decay. This was especially true, as respects the Su-
preme Court, during the twenty-three-year period after 1812, when most of
the famous Marshall constitutional decisions were rendered. For, in 1812, the
Jeffersonians at last obtained a dependable majority on the Court."1 With
the single exception of Joseph Story,' 2 all the Justices appointed up to that
time during Marshall's tenure, and nearly all of those appointed thereafter
during his years on the Court, were hand-picked to vote against him on his
own and the old Federalist views of the Constitution. To suppose, then, as
is ordinarily done, that Marshall was able to get these men to agree with his
'See Story's own statement to this effect in Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. (U.S.) 236, 252
(1845).
"°Morgan, Mr. justice William Johnson and the Constitution, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 328,
333 (1944).
1 There was an Anti-Federalist majority on the Court after 1807; but this was true
only if the Anti-Jeffersonian Anti-Federalist, Samuel Chase, was counted. That the Jeffer-
sonians did not trust Chase is shown by their attempt to remove him from office by im-
peachment, in 1805. Cf., also, Jefferson's attitude when the death of Justice William Cush-
ing, in 1810, opened the way for another Jeffersonian appointment. "Old Cushing is dead,"
he wrote Albert Gallatin. "At length, then, we have a chance of getting a Republican ma-jority in the Supreme Judiciary." 11 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 153 (Federal ed.,
1904-5).
"Jefferson was opposed to President Madison's appointment of Joseph Story: he said
Story was "unquestionably a tory." Consult 4 Beveridge, op. cit. supra note 1 at 106-10,
esp. 109.
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own and the Federalist views in case after case is certainly to suppose the
improbable; and it easy to demonstrate, by a consideration of particular cases,
that Marshall had no such astounding success with his Court.
Let us begin with the old Federalist doctrine that the common law of
England and the acts of Parliament in amendment of the common law, to
the extent that these were in their nature applicable to American conditions,
were "Laws of the United States," as well as laws of the separate states of the
country. This doctrine is so discredited today that I have actually been ac-
cused by various modern legal scholars of being myself guilty of a lack of
scholarship in believing that anybody ever believed such a thing. But the
shoe is on the other foot. There is not a doubt that this was once a commonly
held view.' 3
You may ask what was the constitutional and political importance of this
old forgotten proposition. For one thing, it was important in interpreting
one of the mandatory categories of the national judicial power in the third
article of the Constitution; the category, that is, of "all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under ... the Laws of the United States." For, if the com-
mon law was one of "the Laws of the United States," the national judicial
power would extend, it was thought, by virtue of this provision, to every case
presenting any common law question as a question of national law.14 Be-
cause, however, of the fact that the original Judiciary Act, of 1789, had con-
ferred upon the lower national courts, within this category, a criminal juris-
diction only, the question of the status of the common law as one of "the
Laws of the United States" arose, in the early days of the government,
chiefly in criminal cases.' 5
Concretely, what was at stake in these cases? Well, take one of them that
arose in 1798. One Worrall had tried to bribe an official of the national gov-
ernment. Congress had never passed a statute forbidding such conduct or
making it a crime. The question was: Could Worrall be punished? 16 Again,
there were various places in the United States-such as the sites of "Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings"--that were
"The angriest of my accusers has been Professor Julius Goebel, of the Columbia law
faculty. Consult his Ex Parte Clio, 54 Col. L. Rev. 450 (1954).
"'State criminal prosecutions at common law would not have been included. The com-
mon law applied in such cases, not as national law, but as state law; and the "Cases...
in which a State shall be a Party," of Article III, included, by reason of the earlier enu-
meration in that article, only certain "Controversies," or civil suits. Cf. judge Peters'
opinion in United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. (U.S.) 384 (1798).
'As I have pointed out elsewhere, this view of the common law also underlay the rules
of decision which, under section 34 of the first Judiciary Act, were followed in the na-
tional courts, in equity and admirality cases. Consult P. & C. pp. 865-902. The only report-
ed case in which this phase of the subject is taken up is justice Story's circuit court case of
United States v. Coolidge, 1 Gall. (U.S.) 488 (1813).
'United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. (U.S.) 384 (1798).
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under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States by the terms of the Con-
stitution. Congress had never passed a statute forbidding, and making crimi-
nal, in such places, such acts as murder, robbery, rape, and the like. The ques-
tion, then, was whether these and other unforbidden offenses could be com-
mitted in such places with impunity. 17 The Federalist answer was a sensible
and resounding "No." It was sufficient, they said, that these various acts were
crimes at common law; for the common law, they held, was one of "the
Laws of the United States."' 8 The Jeffersonians denied this and contended
that the foregoing and other offenses could be committed without penalty, as
against the United States, in the absence of acts of Congress of the kind I
have already described.' 9
Why did the Jeffersonians take this seemingly foolish position? To under-
stand their reasons, it is necessary to take into consideration another belief of
the late eighteenth century, of which little is heard today. This was the be-
lief, which the Jeffersonians apparently shared with the Federalists, that the
legislature of every government, including Congress, had power to make rules
of decision for its own courts of justice in all cases that its courts had power
to decide. For, if the common law was one of "the Laws of the United
States," and if, by consequence, the judicial power of the United States ex-
tended to all cases under the common law as national law, then because the
common law itself extended to all subjects, the rule-making power that Con-
gress would have would extend to all subjects, too. In other words, Congress
would have, on this ground entirely separate from all others, the practical
equivalent of a general national legislative authority. Now, Jeffersonism was
a political revolt, chiefly southern in inspiration, against the sort of generally
empowered national government for which the Constitution was intended
to provide. The proposition that led to the consequence I have just stated
had therefore to be denied; and it was denied; and its denial became one of
the cardinal tenets of Jeffersonism. 20
A case involving the common-law criminal jurisdiction of the national
courts was presented to the Supreme Court for decision shortly after the ini-
1 Consult the letter of District Judge Richard Peters, cited in P. & C., p. 782.
" Consult, for example, the answer of the Federalist Massachusetts legislature, of 1799,
to the Virginia Resolutions, of the year before, printed in 4 Elliot's Debates 533, 536 (2d
[24 cm.] ed., 1836). The Federalist view on this subject is recorded in many other places.
For example, see the opinion of Judge Richard Peters in United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall.
(U.S.) 384 (1798). And see Henfield's Case, discussed in P. & C., ch. xx, § 3.
" See James Madison's report to the Virginia House of Delegates, of 1799, on the Vir-
ginia Resolutions, of the year before, printed in 4 Elliot, op. cit. supra note 18 at 546,
561 et seq.
20James Madison, St. George Tucker, and Thomas Jefferson all pointed out, in their
writings, the consequence stated in the text and insisted upon it as the chief reason for re-
jecting the doctrine under discussion. Their statements are cited at length in P. & C., 560-
61, 699, and 763-64. Consult, also, ibid. 630-33 and 669-74.
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tial appearance of a Jeffersonian majority on that tribunal in 1812. This was
the case of United States v. Hudson and Goodwin,21 which the Jeffersonians
had nursed along for six long years, until they finally obtained their majority
on the Court.22 Upon at last getting the case before the Court, the Attorney
General, however, refused to argue it on behalf of the United States: it was
simply too absurd for words. So, the Jeffersonian majority stepped forward
and did what they were supposed to do: they ruled against the common-law
criminal jurisdiction of the national courts and, hence, against the view that
the common law was one of "the Laws of the United States."
From all that appears in the report of this case by William Cranch, the
decision of the Court was unanimous. But, in actual fact, it was not unani-
mous. For this, we have the word of Joseph Story, one of the participating
Justices. The determination had been made, Story said, by a bare majority
of the Court of seven. This statement he made in a case on circuit in Massa-
chusetts in the year immediately following.23 He also said, at another time,
that he had it on the "highest authority'--by which he apparently meant
Chief Justice Marshall-that, in 1804, when the first Jeffersonian had been
appointed to the Court, all the Justices previously on the Court were com-
mitted to the support of the common-law jurisdiction, except Samuel Chase, 24
who was not, I may add, a Federalist, as is usually supposed, but an Anti-
Federalist who happened not to like Thomas Jefferson. Justice Story's own
opposition to the Court's determination of the common-law point in 1812
appears from his circuit-court opinion of 1813, and there were two of the
Justices of the Supreme Court, of 1812, who had been on the Court in 1804.
These were John Marshall and Bushrod Washington. So, these two, with
Joseph Story, made up the minority of three in the case of 1812. In this ini-
tial instance, then, Jeffersonism was triumphant; the ideas of John Marshall,
and of the Federalist party from which he came, were completely repudiated.2 5
Let us consider another of the old Federalist doctrines: the doctrine that,
over and above and beyond its specifically enumerated powers, Congress
possessed a general law-making authority for all the objects of the govern-
ment that the Preamble of the Constitution states. Authority in the govern-
ment, as distinct from its different departments and officers, was deemed by
the Federalists to result from his plain statement of the government's pur-
poses, or objects. The detail in the document related, in the main, to the divi-
7 Cranch (U.S.) 32 (1812).
The background of the Hudson and Goodwin case is fully developed in P. & C. 766-84.
'United States v. Coolidge, 1 Gall. (U.S.) 488, 495 (1813).
" 1 Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story 299 (1851).
" There are also a certain letter of Marshall's, from 1800, in the Library of Congress,
and certain pronouncements of his in Aaron Burr's trial, in 1807, which corroborate the
inference drawn above from Justice Story's statements. Consult P. & C. 1356, n. 45.
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sion of this resulting governmental power between the different departments
and officers. And the Federalists pointed out that the last of Congress' enu-
merated powers in the Legislative Article is not only a power "to make all
Laws" which shall be "necessary and proper" to carry into execution Con-
gress' own specifically enumerated powers, but a power, likewise, "to make all
Laws" which shall be "necessary and proper" to carry into exeuction "all other
Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States"
or in any of its departments or officers. Now, mere inspection of the Constitu-
tion discloses that there are, in the document, no enumerated powers of the
Government, as distinct from the enumerated powers of its different depart-
ments and officers. The "other Powers of the Government" branch of this
final power of Congress is therefore meaningless, unless it is a reference to
"Powers of the Government" that are not enumerated, such as those that re-
sulted, under eighteenth-century views, from the preambular statement of
the Government's general objects. This, the Federalists maintained, was what
this clause had been intended to mean; and they also maintained-or, at any
rate, some of them did-that the Common Defense and General Welfare
Clause earlier in the same section had been intended as a separate and sub-
stantive grant of power to Congress to act for these two great purposes. 26
'Consult the materials cited in P. & C., 193-288 and 241-42. The views against which
the opponents of the Federalists argued are often a good indication of what the Federal-
ist views were in cases where the Federalists' views are imperfectly recorded. Compare
Thomas Jefferson's and Edmund Randolph's opinions on the Bank, P. & C., 196-97, 206-
16, and 248-49.
To the foregoing may be added an interesting statement made by James Madison when
he introduced, in Congress, the initial amendments to the Constitution, on June 8, 1789.
Madison was meeting the objection, which had been made by some of the writers in the
ratification campaign, "that in the Federal Government [a bill of rights was] unnecessary,
because the powers [were] enumerated, and it follow[ed] that all that [were] not granted
by the Constitution [were] retained." This argument, Madison admitted, was "not entirely
without foundation"; yet it was "not," he said, "conclusive to the extent which ha[d] been
supposed." "It [was] true, the powers of the General Government [were] circumscribed,
they [were] directed to particular objects." But "within those limits," there was, he in-
sisted, the same possibility of abuses such as a bill of rights would forbid, as there was
in the case of the states, "because, in the Constitution of the United States there [was],"
he said, "a clause granting to Congress the power to make all laws which shtould] be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested in the Government
of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." "[T]his enables them," he
explained, meaning Congress, "to fulfil every purpose for which the Government was es-
tablished.' (Italics added.) And if there can be any doubt as to what Madison meant by
the word "purpose," that doubt is allayed by his reference in the next succeeding para-
graph to the "securing" of the people's "liberties" "to themselves and [their] posterity"
as an "express purpose" for which the "new system" of government was "ordained and
established." 1 Annals of Congress 438-39 (1789-90).
In other words, Madison was measuring "the powers of the Government" by the "ob-
jects" stated in the Preamble; and he was measuring "the powers of Congress," in their
totality, by the fact that that body was expressly empowered to make "all" necessary
and proper laws to carry into execution "all the powers vested in the Government." And,
hence, his conclusion that Congress was empowered to "fulfil every purpose for which the
19561
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When the first Bank of the United States under the Constitution was
formed in 1791, the doctrines supportive of the general national lawmaking
authority of Congress were apparently the main reliance within Congress
itself, in support of the constitutionality of the proposed bank. Edmund
Randolph, as Attorney General, in one of the opinions he gave to President
Washington, spoke of these views as "the doctrines of the friends of the bill." 27
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that these same doctrines were
presented to the Supreme Court, in support of the second bank under the
Constitution, when, in 1819, its constitutionality was questioned in the case
of McCulloch v. Maryland.28 The doctrines were presented by one of the
great advocates of the time, William Pinkney, of Maryland. After hearing
Pinkney's argument, Justice Joseph Story declared that "all the cobwebs of
sophistry and metaphysics about State rights and State sovereignty [had
been] brushed away [by Pinkney] with," what Story described as "a mighty
besom." "[N]ever, in my whole life," said Story, "[have I] heard a greater
speech; it was worth a journey from Salem [to Washington] to hear it .... ,,29
What did Pinkney say? We do not know exactly. But we do know he spoke
for three days. 30 So, what we have in Wheaton's Reports is only a meager
outline. The part relating to the old Federalist doctrine of general power be-
gins by pointing out that "all the objects of the government are national ob-
jects," and by insisting that "the means [for accomplishing these objects]
are, and must be, [such as are] fitted to accomplish them." "These objects,"
said Pinkney, "are enumerated in the Constitution," whereupon he read the
Preamble. "For the attainment of these vast objects," he then went on, "the
government is armed with powers and faculties corresponding in magnitude."
He next ran over the various Congressional powers enumerated in the Legis-
lative Article, presenting the Common Defense and General Welfare Clause
as a separate substantive grant; the commerce power, apparently, as compre-
hensive; and the "necessary and proper" clause with emphasis upon the fact
that it extended to "all the powers of the Government." Then he concluded
by castigating those who "doubted [that] a government invested with such
immense powers ha[d] authority to erect a corporation within the sphere of
Government was established"; or, in other words, every "purpose," or "object," that the
Preamble states.
The foregoing passages corroborate inferences I have elsewhere drawn, on the basis of
evidence of other kinds, as to the nature of Madison's real views of the scope of the na-
tional powers, in 1789. See P. & C., 406-8 and 688-90. The passages I now cite I somehow
overlooked on these earlier occasions.
'See P. & C., 193-205 and 211.
S4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316 (1819).
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its general objects, and in order to accomplish some of those objects! "31 As
may be perceived, the reliance in this part of Pinkney's argument was pri-
marily upon the objects stated in the Preamble.
Now, what did Chief justice Marshall have to say about these old Feder-
alist ideas in the Court's opinion? He said nothing about them; he ignored
them completely, though there are one or two passages which suggest that he
may originally have noticed them favorably before the opinion was seen by
his judicial brethren.32 Instead of noticing the old Federalist ideas that
Pinkney had urged, Marshall declared, early in the opinion, that "this govern-
ment is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers." "The princi-
ple, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too ap-
parent," he said, "to have required to be enforced by all those arguments,
which its enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, [had]
found it necessary to urge. . . ." "[T]hat principle," he flatly declared, "is
now universally admitted."3 3 Well-at least as we understand this principle
today-William Pinkney did not admit it, and there were a good many other
men who still did not admit it, at the time when Marshall wrote.34 Yet all
the Chief Justice could do for the old ideas Pinkney had urged was to add,
in the opinion, that "the question respecting the extent of the powers actually
granted," was, of course, "perpetually arising, and w[ould] probably continue
to arise, so long as our system sh[ould] exist."3 5 This, perhaps, could be taken
as saving the question of the true interpretation of the Common Defense and
General Welfare Clause and, also, of the "Powers of Government" branch of
the "necessary and proper" clause, because each of these is, after all, among
the enumerated-that is, the "actually granted"-powers of Congress.
I have said that, in 1791, the doctrine of general authority for all the pur-
poses that the Preamble states was the main reliance, in Congress itself, in
support of the constitutionality of the first Bank of the United States. This
doctrine was not, however, the sole reliance of the friends of the bank bill in
Congress. In addition, they relied upon the enumerated fiscal powers, espe-
cially in the light of the "necessary and proper" clause, as being themselves
sufficient to warrant the proposed enactment. And there was reliance, also,
upon Congress' power to regulate commerce as likewise sufficient in itself to
warrant the intended act of incorporation.36 In the opinion that Alexander
' 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 381-82 (1819).
'See the second paragraph beginning on p. 406 of the opinion and the first paragraph
beginning on p. 421 thereof.
M4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 404 (1819).
Consult the debates in Congress cited in P. & C., 234-35 and 240-42.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 404 (1819).
Consult P. & C., 196-205. The only extant report of the debates in the House of Rep-
resentatives (2 Annals of Congress 1894 [1790]) is very incomplete and imperfect. The
inference of great incompleteness arises, in part from the disparity between the total vol-
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Hamilton a little later gave to President Washington, the reliance was also
upon the commerce power and the fiscal powers to support the act. The gen-
eral authority of the government, Hamilton, unlike the men in Congress, did
not discuss.37
It has often been said that John Marshall's opinion in McCullock v. Mary-
land is little more than a repetition of the opinion that Hamilton gave to
President Washington in 1791. There are undoubtedly resemblances between
these two opinions, as, indeed, there could hardly fail to be. But there are
differences, also; and the differences indicate, I think, that John Marshall, in
1819, was already having trouble getting some of his Court to agree to another
of the old Federalist views of the Constitution; the view, that is, that the
commerce power of Congress is comprehensive.38
Now, the mere fact that there was reliance upon the commerce power by
Hamilton, and by the men in Congress, in support of the constitutionality of
the Bank, is, in itself, a sure indication of how these old Federalists under-
stood this particular Congressional power. For to be relevant to the subject
and ground the conclusion that these men drew, the power had to be under-
stood as complete. Had it, instead, been taken as subject to an interstate
limitation, the conclusion they drew would not have followed; for the Bank,
it must be remembered, was being incorporated to carry on its business not
only in foreign and interstate commerce, but in intrastate commerce as well.3 9
Examination of Hamilton's opinion will show that he developed his argu-
ment based on the commerce power, and relied upon it as sufficient to support
ume of the recorded debates, and the time known to have been consumed in them. Besides
this, the recorded speeches, as well as the opinions later rendered to President Washington
by Edmund Randolph and Thomas Jefferson, contain references to arguments not found
in the recorded speeches. There are references, even, to whole speeches that are not re-
corded. And, finally, there is a want of fullness and logical coherence, in developing vari-
ous doctrines in the recorded speeches, which indicates fragmentary and garbled reporting.
A brief example will make clear what is meant. James Jackson, of Georgia, denying the
adequacy of the commerce power, is recorded to have said: "The power to regulate trade
is said to involve this [incorporating power] as a necessary means; but the powers conse-
quent on this express power are specified, such as regulating light houses, ships, harbors,
&c." 2 Annais of Congress 1917 (1834). There are, of course, no "specified" powers over
"light houses, ships, [or] harbors" in the Constitution. What Jackson said, or meant, is
thus completely obscure.
'3 The Works of Alexander Hamilton 445-93 (Federal ed., 1904) ; cf., P. & C., 216-28.
On this general subject, see P. & C., 17-292.
I am aware that there are some passages in Hamilton's opinion on the Bank which,
isolatedly considered, might be taken by a modem reader as evidence that he understood
the commerce power as subject to an interstate limitation; but, as I have elsewhere shown,
these passages arose out of certain peculiarities of eighteenth-century speech. See P. & C.,
218-28. Consult also The Federalist, No. VI, and index thereof, where, under the general
head of "Dissensions"-or "War"--"between the States," Hamilton listed and discussed
Shays' Rebellion, an insurrection entirely internal to Massachusetts, and, likewise, the sub-
ject of intrastate tranquility generally.
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his conclusion, quite as much as he did his argument based on Congress' fiscal
powers. Chief Justice Marshall followed Hamilton, in McCulloch v. Maryland,
to the extent of citing Congress' "power to regulate commerce" as amongst
the powers that were relevant to the case; 40 but the Chief Justice went no
further. In the actual discussion in the opinion, the reliance is wholly upon
Congress' fiscal powers; and today, after more than a century's acceptance of
the interstate theory of the commerce power, the very fact that Marshall
cited this power as relevant in McCulloch v. Maryland is generally forgotten.
The accepted doctrine is that Congress' power to incorporate national banks
depends upon its fiscal powers alone.
Now, to have grounded the conclusion in McCulloch v. Maryland, not only
upon the fiscal powers of Congress, but, alternatively, upon its commerce
power, would have been to make the case a far, far broader precedent in
favor of Congressional power than the case, as it was decided, actually was.
For to have put the case upon this alternative ground would have been to
recognize that Congress' power to regulate commerce was complete: that
Congress could regulate all domestic as well as all foreign commerce. The
situation in the McCulloch case was this: The Bank of the United States
there involved was not the old Federalist bank incorporated in 1791; it was
a newer bank created by a Jeffersonian Congress, and approved by the second
Jeffersonian President, James Madison, in 1816. The Jeffersonian majority
on Marshall's Court were apparently willing to uphold this act of their own
party; but, equally apparently, they wished to do this on the narrowest pos-
sible ground. So, the decision was put on the fiscal powers only, and the rele-
vancy of the commerce power was not developed in the case. Again, then, it
can be seen, a doctrine that the old Federalists had considered relevant to
Congress' incorporating a bank was excluded from the McCulloch case, rather
than read into this famous Marshall opinion.
The Chief Justice's citation of the commerce power suggests, nevertheless,
that its relevancy may have been developed and relied upon in some earlier
version of the opinion. Whether this actually happened or not, the citation
certainly seems to indicate that Marshall, himself, like Hamilton and other
Federalists in 1791, considered the commerce power to be relevant; and, for
reasons I have already assigned, this means that he must have regarded it as
a complete power over the subject: a power to regulate all domestic as well
as all foreign commerce. This surmise is borne out by what Marshall had to
say about this power, two years later, in Cohens v. Virginia. It was in the
famous passage that begins: "[T]he United States form, for many, and for
most important purposes, a single nation. . . ." "In war," Marshall went on,((we are one people. In making peace, we are one people." And then, finally,
he declared that, "in all commercial regulations, we are one and the same
"04 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 406 (1819).
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people." "[F]or all these purposes, [America's] government," he said, "is
complete; to all these objects, it is competent. '41
Now, I do not see how it is possible to read these statements from the
Cohens case as other than a plain recognition by Chief Justice Marshall that
the power of Congress to regulate commerce was a complete power: that it
extended to all domestic as well as all foreign commerce. The language
Marshall used is totally irreconcilable with the view that he thought the pow-
er one to regulate foreign and interstate commerce only. How Marshall was
able to get these statements approved by his judicial brethren in the Cohens
case, I do not know; but the statements are there, and their meaning seems
plain. So, we may take it that John Marshall, in 1821, took the same view
of the national commerce power that Alexander Hamilton and other Federal-
ists had taken in the early 1790's.
This view, I might add, was also the view taken by the majority of the men
in Congress, in the 18201s.42 It seems, however, not to have been the view of
the Jeffersonian majority on Marshall's Court. For, when the famous New York
steamboat monopoly case of Gibbons v. Ogden was decided in 1824, Marshall
receded from the position he had taken, three years earlier, in Cohens v.
Virginia. In the Gibbons case, Marshall no longer maintained that the United
States were a single nation as to "all commercial regulations." Instead,
though referring to the language of the Constitution as "comprehensive," he
declared that the power it gave might, nevertheless, "very properly be re-
stricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one." Once again,
then, we have a failure, on John Marshall's part, to read into one of his
Court's decisions what it is clear was his own and an old Federalist view of
the Constitution. 43
But although that fact is certain, it is a mistake to suppose, as is frequently
done, that, in the Gibbons case, Marshall interpreted the commerce power
in the meager dimensions in which that power existed during the major part
of our subsequent history. In other words, it is a mistake to suppose that
John Marshall, in the Gibbons case, interpreted Congress' internal power
over commerce as a power to regulate interstate commerce only. The Chief
Justice said that the power was being restricted to "that commerce which
concerns more States than one"; and what he meant by these words, his
opinion makes abundantly clear. He meant by them all commerce of a domes-
tic kind that was of interest, or importance, to more than a single state; and
he meant this, whether the particular commerce was interstate or not. Mar-
shall said, moreover, that, with respect to all such commerce, Congress' power
was "plenary"-"as absolut[e]," he declared, "as [a commerce power] would
"6 Wheat. (U.S.) 264, 412-14 (1821).
"Consult the debates in Congress cited in P. & C., 240-50.
13 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 194 (1824).
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be in a single government .. " And whenever Congress acted under this
great power, any conflicting state law must yield, whether the law in question
was one for the regulation of a state's own purely domestic commerce or one
for the regulation of its system of internal police.44
That Gibbons v. Ogden was not contemporaneously understood as adopting
the interstate theory of the commerce power is shown, moreover, by what
happened in the following year, in the state of New York. The interstate
theory was not then entirely unknown. It had been thought up, somewhat
earlier, by lawyers for the New York steamboat monopoly and had been ap-
plied by the highest court of the state, in 1812, to uphold the monopoly as
between citizens of the state, in respect to traffic between the New York cities
of New York and Albany. This was in the case of Livingston v. Van Ingen,
a case which, because the defendants were bought off by the successful plain-
tiffs, was not appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. 45 Gibbons
v. Ogden, though not actually adopting the interstate theory, had involved
steamboat movements only between New York and New Jersey. The decision,
then, left technically open the question whether the New York monopoly
law was still good with respect to movements such as had been involved in the
Van Ingen case; that is, with respect to movements wholly within the state.
A case was accordingly begun in the New York courts, a few weeks after the
Gibbons decision, to settle this question. Under the title of North River
Steamboat Company v. Livingston, the case was carried to the highest court
of the state, in 1825. The New York court thereupon overruled the interstate
doctrine of its earlier decision and, on the authority of the Gibbons case,
brought the New York steamboat monopoly completely to an end, both in
intrastate and interstate commerce.40
Now, it is needless to say that the New York court would never have taken
such action had it understood the Supreme Court's decision of the preceding
year as one adopting the interstate theory of the commerce power.47 But if
the interstate theory did not originate in Gibbons v. Ogden, you may well ask
how, and when, the theory did originate. The answer is that the theory was
read into John Marshall's decision in the Gibbons case by his Jacksonian
successor, Roger Brooke Taney. Marshall's doctrine of plenary national su-
premacy, which he had announced so clearly in the Gibbons case, was over-
turned, within two years of his death, by the Jacksonian Court. This occurred
" 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 197, 209-10 (1824). Consult the discussion of this case in P. & C.,
250-92.
" 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 507 (1812). Consult P. & C., 231-34.
16 1 Hopk. (N.Y. Ch.) 151 (1824); S.C. 3 Cow. (N.Y.) 711 (1825); consult the discus-
sion in P. & C., 268-80.
'"For further evidence that Gibbons v. Ogden was not contemporaneously understood
as adopting the interstate theory of the national power, see P. & C., 280-87.
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in New York v. Miln, in 1837, when it was indicated by the Court that the
whole field of internal police was free of the national supremacy.48 Ten years
later, Chief Justice Taney blew this unwarranted concept up to include the
regulation of all intrastate commerce. He did this in his oft-quoted definition
of the states' police powers, in the License Cases, of 1847.
"[T]he police power of a State," said Chief Justice Taney, is "the power
of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of [a
state's] dominion." And, then, in specific reference to the subject of com-
merce, he added that "[elvery State [might]regulate its own internal traffic,
according to its own judgment," and "free," he declared, "from any control-
ling power on the part of the general government." He was "not aware," he
added, "that these principles ha[d] ever been questioned. '49 One might
suppose from this statement that Chief Justice Taney had never read Gibbons
v. Ogden; but his own memories went back to the founding of the Govern-
ment, and we may feel quite sure he knew exactly what he was about. His
statements, at any rate, constitute, I believe, the earliest evidence of adher-
ence to the interstate theory of the commerce power to be found in the Su-
preme Court's reports. The theory was not actually applied against Congress
until 1869.50
One more matter, and I shall have done. This one other matter is the in-
tended place of the Supreme Court of the United States in the country's jurid-
ical system, and what happened to the Court's intended position in that sys-
tem during John Marshall's tenure of office. The original intention was that
the Court should be the general juridical head of the country, with a supreme
appellate jurisdiction over all other courts, state and national, with respect to
all kinds of law. A contemporary, Judge Charles Huston, of Pennsylvania,
said, in 1836, that this view of the Court's position had been "a general opin-
ion among lawyers and judges" when the Government first was formed.51
There is abundant evidence to show that Judge Huston was correct; and
among the lawyers adhering to this view in the early years was John Marshall,
then a practitioner in Virginia.
52
As is well known, Marshall, along with his brother, James, and his brother-
in-law, Rawleigh Colston, agreed, in 1793, to purchase the huge Fairfax es-
tate in Virginia, from its English owner, Denny Martin Fairfax. The difficulty
was that the three would-be purchasers lacked the necessary funds, and Fair-
fax, who was then sixty-eight years old and had been trying vainly for ten
years to get something out of his Virginian inheritance, wanted to be paid the
', 11 Pet. (U.S.) 102, 138 (1837).
9 5 How. (U.S.) 504, 574, 582 (1847).
r' United States v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 41 (1869).
' Barnes v. Irvine, 5 Watts (Pa.) 557, 558 (1836).
On this general subject, consult P. & C., chaps. xviii-xxi and xxii-xxvi.
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money. This necessitated borrowing by the Marshall group; and this, in turn,
necessitated settling the title to the estate in question. What John Marshall
did, as Fairfax's lawyer, to settle this title, along with the nature of the ques-
tions that the title involved, demonstrates beyond any question what view
Marshall took, in the middle 1790's, of the Supreme Court's intended powers
and position, in the country's juridical system.
The title to the Fairfax estate depended upon the favorable settlement of
a number of different legal questions. Some of these were questions of com-
mon law; some others were questions of Virginia state statutory law; and
some were questions under treaties of the United States. The important point
is that all these points had to be settled favorably to Fairfax to clear up the
title. For this purpose, accordingly, John Marshall, in 1795, began an action
in ejectment in the United States circuit court, in Virginia, with respect to a
plot of some 700 acres of the Fairfax estate; and this case was carried to the
Supreme Court of the United States, in the following year, for final decision
to settle the title to the whole.
Now, it is elementary law that the decision in an action of ejectment did
not, as a judgment, settle the title even to the land to which the action related,
and still less, of course, did it settle the title, as a judgment, to land which
was not the subject of the action, at all. There was, then, only one way in
which the Supreme Court's decision of the case appealed to it in 1796 could
have settled the title, either to the 700 acres to which the action related, or
to all the remainder of the huge Fairfax estate: the Supreme Court's decision
could have settled that title only as a supreme and binding judicial precedent
upon all the points of law, state, common, and national, upon which the title
depended. And the Court's decision, as such a precedent, could have settled
the title, only if it was binding on all courts, state and national alike, with
respect to every question of law that the title involved. The particular case
was never decided, but eventually dismissed because of a partial compromise,
entered into, in 1796-97, between the state of Virginia and the Fairfax claim-
ants. It is nevertheless clear, from John Marshall's behavior in bringing the
action and pressing the appeal, that, in the middle 1790's, he believed the Su-
preme Court of the United States to be the highest court in the country on
questions of all kinds of law.53
This inference as to Marshall's opinion upon this subject is confirmed by
his later behavior, as Chief Justice, in deciding the case of Huidekoper's
Lessee v. Douglass, in 1805, in the Supreme Court of the United States.54
The Huidekoper case was another action of ejectment brought to settle the
title to certain lands by getting a supreme legal precedent upon the point of
'On this general subject, see P. & C., ch. xxiv, §§ 3 and 4. The case referred to in the
text is dealt with at pp. 789-93.
"3 Cranch (U.S.) 1 (1805).
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law on which the title depended. The title to the lands, which lay in Pennsyl-
vania, depended upon the meaning of an act of the Pennsylvania legislature
of the 3rd of April 1792. The Pennsylvania state courts had twice interpreted
this statute unfavorably to the claim of the plaintiff in the Huidekoper case,
before that action had even been started. Marshall and his Court neverthe-
less decided the same point in favor of the plaintiff in the case in question.
Now, it is important to understand that Marshall and his Court could not
possibly have been ignorant of the purpose of the Huidekoper litigation, for
the use of ejectment actions to settle land titles in the manner I have de-
scribed was a common practice among lawyers of the period. 5 Marshall and
his Court must, then, have thought that they had power to settle the title in
the case before them by settling the meaning of the Pennsylvania statute
upon which the title depended. Any other view would make their disregard
of the Pennsylvania precedents frivolous in an extreme degree.5 6
The Court of 1805 still had, to be sure, a majority of Federalists upon it.
So, the question remains of what happened to this old Federalist doctrine of
the Court's general juridical supremacy after the Supreme Court fell under
Jeffersonian domination in 1812. The answer is that the doctrine at first fared
surprisingly well. Thus, in 1813, in another case carried to the Supreme
Court to settle the Fairfax title, the Court-minus Chief Justice Marshall of
course-decided all the points involved in the title, whether of common law,
state law, or national law, in exactly the way John Marshall had hoped the
Court would do in the case of 1796.57 This later case, moreover, was appealed
to the Supreme Court from the state courts, not the national courts, of Vir-
ginia; and when the Virginia state court, in 1815, attacked the Supreme
Court's decision as unconstitutional, that body, upon a second appeal to it,
in 1816, vindicated its earlier action, and, consequently, its claim to the
general juridical headship of the country, completely.
This was in the famous case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, Justice Joseph
Story speaking for the Court.58 That case, I am aware, is today usually
taken as a claim of judicial supremacy merely as to so-called "federal ques-
tions"; that is, as to questions of the meaning of the Constitution, statutes,
and treaties, of the United States. The case, in fact, was much more than this,
as, I am confident, any lawyer will agree who will take the trouble to read
the case in context with the earlier phases of the Fairfax litigation; that is,
' Cf. the statement of Chief justice Oliver Ellsworth, in Sims v. Irvine, 3 DalI. (U.S.)
425 (1799), another ejectment action intended to settle a ]and title under state law, that
"the case ha[d] been brought here'---that is, to the Supreme Court of the United States-
"to settle the title."
' For a full consideration of the Huidekoper case, see P. & C., ch. xxiii, § 4.
"'Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 603 (1813). See P. & C., ch.
xxiv, § 3.
1 Wheat. (U.S.) 304 (1816). Consult P. & C., ch. xxiv, § 4.
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in context with the two opinions in the Virginia court and the earlier Su-
preme Court decision, of 1813, which the Martin opinion was written to vin-
dicate.59 The case, in view of the land title it was intended to settle and the
earlier decision it was meant to vindicate, was necessarily a claim of judicial
supremacy over the Virginia court as to questions of all kinds of law what-
soever.
The principles of the Martin case were a second time affirmed in Cohens
v. Virginia, in 1821.60 The Virginia court, nevertheless, never acknowledged
these principles, though it did contrive to avoid a clash with the Supreme
Court on any of the involved points of law; and the Marshalls kept their
lands. A somewhat similar policy was followed with respect to the Huidekoper
decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Then, in the middle 1820's,
the Supreme Court of the United States began to weaken; and in a series of
decisions culminating in Wheaton v. Peters, in 1834,61 the Supreme Court ab-
dicated its supremacy over the state courts completely, with respect to all
questions of state law and common law. At the time, indeed, it seemed as if
the Court were abdicating its right, even, of independent decision with re-
spect to all such questions. So, John Marshall, at the very close of his career,
was obliged to witness, once more, an extensive denial, by his Court, of prin-
ciples in which, we have seen, he firmly believed, and which, furthermore, he
must have known were the views of the Federalist founders of the Govern-
ment.
It would be possible to add to the foregoing instances; but enough has
been said, I hope, to convince you that the usual view of John Marshall's
career is hardly tenable. John Marshall did not carry on a continual frontal
assault, uniformly successful, upon the subversive principles of Jeffersonism.
Instead, he fought a long and stubborn rearguard action to defend the Con-
stitution against those principles. And it was, on the whole, a losing fight.
Time after time, during his long career, Marshall was forced into compromise
or defeat; and the result was a pretty complete transformation of the Con-
stitution by the date of his death.
No one, it may be added, was more aware of what was going on than John
Marshall. As his biographer has shown from the letters of his closing years,
Marshall died almost in despair of the future of the Union. He was con-
vinced that the South-and his own state of Virginia, in particular-were
'That is, in order: Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee, 1 Munf. (Va.) 218 (1810); Fairfax's
Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 603 (1813) ; Hunter v. Martin, 4 Munf. (Va.)
1 (1815); and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (U.S.) 304 (1816). Consult P. & C.,
ch. xxiv, § S 3 and 4.
'6 Wheat. (U.S.) 264 (1821).
The important members of the series were: Jackson ex dem. St. John v. Chew, 12
Wheat. (U.S.) 153 (1827); Green v. Neal's Lessee 6 Pet. (U.S.) 291 (1832); and Wheaton
v. Peters, 8 Pet. (U.S.) 591 (1834). For a full discussion, consult P. & C., ch. xxv.
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determined to convert the Union into a loose confederation.6 2 And that he
was not far wrong is shown by the action I have already noted of the south-
ern-dominated Taney court that came into power upon Marshall's death, in
1835. Its initial action in substituting the principle of the inviolability of the
states' police powers, for Marshall's principle of plenary national supremacy,
was greeted, by one of the nationalists of the time, as a return to the prin-
ciples of the Articles of Confederation.0 3 Such, there can be no doubt, it
truly was, especially after the concept of state police power was blown up to
include the regulation of all intrastate commerce, as it was in the License
Cases, of 1847.64
These two principles-the interstate theory of Congress' power over com-
merce and the inviolability of the police powers of the states-were certainly
basic to our constitutional law until times very recent; and these principles
derived, not from the decisions of John Marshall, but from unjustified glosses
upon his decisions by Roger Brooke Taney and the Jacksonian Court that
came into power upon Marshall's death. So far, moreover, as our constitu-
tional law actually has been based on Marshall's decisions, it has involved
much more of Jeffersonism than of Federalism; much more of the views of
Marshall's associates on the Court than of Marshall's own ideas. And the
fragments of Federalism that did survive in the Marshall decisions repre-
sented, in the main, no more than what Marshall's associates felt compelled
to agree to, in order to reach results that they desired to reach on other
grounds. In saying these things, I do not mean to imply that John Marshall
had no victories at all, for this would not be true; but I do mean to say that,
on the great fundamental theses of Federalism-the theses that went to the
very character of the government-the theses that I have here reviewed-
John Marshall was defeated, either by his own Court or by the Taney Court
that succeeded him.
Does this conclusion, then, impugn Marshall's claim to greatness? I can
only say that, so far as I am concerned, I do not think it does. A man may
be great in tragedy as well as triumph, in defeat as well as victory. And
since there was, it seems to me, much more of tragedy and defeat, than of
triumph and victory, in John Marshall's career as defender of the Constitu-
tion, we must, I think, revise our estimate of the nature of his career to see
him as he truly was. His greatness, clearly, was not that of triumphant vic-
tory. It was a greatness that consisted in devoting half a lifetime to a cause
in which he profoundly believed; in faithful service to that cause in the face
6s4 Beveridge, op. cit. supra note 1, ch. x; esp. pp. 575-78.
46 The North American Review, 126, 154 (1838). The commentator was said to be
Henry Wheaton.
"New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. (U.S.) 102 (1837); License Cases, 5 How. (U.S.) 504
(1847).
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of overwhelming odds; in unflagging courage in the face of those odds, and
in the face of constantly recurring defeats. There can be no doubt, moreover,
that John Marshall, in spite of the conditions in which he worked, ac-
complished much in the way of minimizing damage; that it was, indeed, a
"fortunate" thing, as Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, in 1901, that it fell
to Marshall, and not an appointee of Thomas Jefferson, to serve, in the
critical early years of the nineteenth century, as Chief Justice of the United
States. This circumstance, I think, probably saved the Union.
So, although I take a very different view of Marshall's work than is usually
taken, he still remains to me "the great Chief Justice." There is not one of
his predecessors, not one of those who succeeded him, that I should think,
for a moment, of nominating in his place.
